297 research outputs found
Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?
Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, „ontic‟ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting
Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism
The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the first view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by Dancy. Indeed, it turns out that the view that practical reasons are propositions is by no means unworkable and in fact, at least under certain assumptions, explicit considerations can be made in favour of a propositional construal of reasons
Relational Time
This paper defends a relational view of time based on recent work on quantum gravity. Julian barbour's relational approach to physical theory, in particular, is developed as a basis for a relational, rather than anti-realist, metaphysics of time
Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?
Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic meta-induction on the history of science. Some authors, however, suggested that the preservation of structure across theory-change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. While the possibility of this latter, „ontic‟ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, though, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this paper, I distinguish between two arguments in favour of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature, and find both of them wanting
From Ontic Structural Realism to Metaphysical Coherentism
The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, symmetries and the like are fundamental – especially in quantum physics – are best understood not in terms of physical relations being fundamental, but rather in terms of ‘metaphysical coherentism’ – the view according to which object-like parts of reality exhibit symmetric relations of ontological dependence. The coherentist perspective is developed in some detail and contrasted with extant varieties of structuralism and holism
Inherent Properties and Statistics with Individual Particles in Quantum Mechanics
This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the distinctive features of quantum statistics are exclusively
determined by the nature of the properties it describes. In particular, all statistically relevant properties
of identical quantum particles in many-particle systems are conjectured to be irreducible, ‘inherent’
properties only belonging to the whole system. This allows one to explain quantum statistics without
endorsing the ‘Received View’ that particles are non-individuals, or postulating that quantum systems
obey peculiar probability distributions, or assuming that there are primitive restrictions on the range of
states accessible to such systems. With this, the need for an unambiguously metaphysical explanation
of certain physical facts is acknowledged and satisfied
Moderately naturalistic metaphysics
The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.Peer reviewe
Oggetti fisici (e non)
This essay aims to discuss a potential conflict between two intuitions about material objects: a 'pluralist' one, according to which every object belongs (or may belong) to more than one kind, and a 'reductionist' one, according to which there is only one fundamental type of things, i.e., material things. The former view threatens to translate a merely subjective matter of fact into an ontological fact, while the latter naturally leads to an outdated form of physicalism. What then? How to satisfy both the request for a precise ontology and the need to make sense of the richness of our experience of things? The paper reconstructs the general structure of the issue, and explores two ways of solving it via the formulation of an intermediate view
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